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Introduction
Cross border capital flows play an increasingly important role in the global economy. In order to reap the benefits associated with capital inflows, many governments followed a capital account liberalization strategy in the past decades. Economic theory suggests that international capital flows boost productive capacity, promote competitiveness and enhance efficiency. While capital flows can bring potential benefits to the financial system, they also carry risks due to their volatility, size and the channels of contagion that they create. To prevent the materialization of these risks, a better understanding of capital flows is imperative.
While there is extensive empirical research on net capital flows, it is only recently that a new strand of literature has paved the way for research on gross capital flows. Following that there is a high correlation between the behavior of non-residents buying net domestic assets and residents buying net foreign assets due to the significant financial integration among these economies. However, when looking at the flows of emerging economies ( Figure   2 ), this correlation is much lower and this difference is even more relevant if we take a particular emerging economy. As net flows reflect only a small part of international movements, it is of interest to analyze the behavior of foreign and domestic agents separately.
1. Gross capital inflows are defined as the difference between the purchases and sales of domestic assets by nonresidents, which are the sum of all liabilities (FDI, portfolio and other investment). Analogously, gross capital outflows are the difference between the purchases and sales of foreign assets by residents, which can be decomposed into FDI, portfolio and other investment assets. The objective of this paper is to assess the role of institutions as a driver of global capital flows over the last twenty years, highlighting the significant changes in the behavior of domestic and foreign investors during periods of financial stress. The focus is on two questions. How relevant are institutions to explain the pattern of flows in the long term? And, in periods of financial stress, do markets discriminate among economies according to their institutions? Our main hypothesis relies on the fact that foreign agents might base their decisions not only on economic pull factors but also on institutional pull factors. In contrast to the neoclassical theory for which the crucial factor of institutional quality was the security of property rights, we base our analysis on a broad definition of "good governance". Institutional quality refers to the governance infrastructure of countries, defined broadly as "the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised", (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004) . This definition includes the political process, civil liberties, the ability of governments to implement sound and credible policies and the respect for institutions. The neoclassical theory predicts that capital flows to countries with a higher marginal rate of return. But institutional quality can affect the expected net value of investment as it takes into consideration property rights and the credibility of government policy. An improvement in institutional quality should attract more capital inflows if investors look for safer investments (flight to quality hypothesis). In contrast, institutions also affect domestic decisions. There is a trade-off. On the one hand, a sound institutional framework creates a market-friendly environment, boosting domestic demand and foreign investment. On the other hand, if the political ability or the property rights of a country improve, domestic agents might allocate more resources in their residence country instead of abroad, which effect prevails is a matter that should be empirically tested.
To assess the relevance of these hypotheses, we build a database comprising of quarterly data for 56 countries, differentiating between high-income and low and middleincome states, over the period 1996-2012. As far as we know, there has not been a systematic attempt to analyze the linkage between gross capital flows and governance, but only on the relation between foreign direct investment (FDI) and institutional quality. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) conclude that governance is a relevant driver of both inward and outward FDI for developed and developing countries over 1995-1997. Buchanan et al (2012) find that institutional quality is positively associated with FDI and negatively correlated to FDI volatility. There has not been much discussion regarding the impact of institutional factors during financial crises. We contribute to the literature by creating an institutional quality index over 1996-2012 and assessing its impact on the behavior of gross capital flows and their components. Our main findings are the following. First, employing fixed effect models, our results clearly suggest that institutional quality is an important driver of gross capital flows, mainly driven by the dynamics of FDI and portfolio flows. Countries with better quality public services tend to attract more investment and, in high-income countries, create an adequate environment to boost economic activity and investment abroad. Indeed, IV estimates suggest the existence of a causal link for a sub-sample of 25 countries. Secondly, Government
Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality seem to be the most important determinants of capital flows. Finally, institutional quality turns out to be also relevant during periods of financial stress. Domestic investors tend to retrench more capital flows if they live in countries with a sound institutional framework, which compensates for the negative effects of declining capital inflows. Therefore, good institutions incentivize the build-up of external savings, by promoting larger outflows, in normal times in high-income countries. And, then, they also facilitate the repatriation of such assets during crises. This paper is related to different lines of literature. First, it is closely related to the considerable empirical research on the determinants of net capital flows during the last decades. These analyses distinguish between push and pull factors. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the data.
Section 3 describes the baseline empirical model and reports fixed effect estimates. This section is divided into two parts. The first subsection analyzes the effect of institutional quality on capital flows and tackles the endogeneity bias of institutional indicators using instrumental variable estimates, whereas the second subsection introduces the different characteristics of institutional governance.
In section 4, we analyze the impact of crises on capital flow drivers introducing a dummy in our baseline model and interacting it with institutional quality. We complement this analysis distinguishing between global and domestic crises. Section 5 concludes and highlights some policy implications. 
Institutional indicators:
In order to assess the role of institutional quality as a determinant of capital flows, we use a there is no evidence of systemic trends related to world average governance when analyzing individual data sources. The results vary depending on the source and on the type of 4. All scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, higher scores indicating better governance quality before the transformation. 5. As many researchers, like Jolliffe (1982) , have stressed the principal components with low variance can also be important in predicting outcomes and in determining causal relationships.
governance indicator. In addition, it has the advantage of keeping some of the cardinal information of the underlying data, while providing information about changes in the relative positions of countries over time. Therefore, relative and absolute changes in a country's governance are likely to be similar.
Control variables data
We choose pull factors widely used in the literature-the country´s GDP growth, the spread of long term interest rates, public debt to GDP, credit to GDP, the ratio of reserves including gold to GDP, credit to GDP and the quadratic term of credit to GDP -and relevant push factors-the volatility index (VIX), the world GDP growth and US long term interest rates. Some variables have been excluded following a stepwise procedure as they turn out to be insignificant. This is the case for inflation, primary balance and commercial openness. In addition, we exclude the financial openness index (Chinn-Ito Index) from the baseline model due to its lack of variability for high-income economies and we only use it in a robustness check model. The data appendix provides information about the sources and definitions of all variables. (Table 4) In order to assess the role of institutional quality during periods of financial stress, we use a dummy on a quarterly basis to identify periods of crises using the database from Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012 Crisis (GFC). Table 5 takes into consideration and provides details of the exact periods of crises per country. Table 6 in Appendix reports descriptive statistics of capital flows and governance indicators, whereas Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of control variables. As shown in Table 6 , cross-country institutional quality varies across countries. For instance, institutional quality index ranges from -6.05 for Venezuela in 2010 to 3.5 for Finland in 2004; higher scores indicating better governance. Figure 3 shows the cross-country variation. In 2012, the country with the worst political institutions was Venezuela whereas Finland and Sweden benefitted from a sound governance framework. In addition, the "within" country variation in this panel data is also relevant, as observed in Figure 4 . While Argentina and Greece have witnessed a worsening of their governance indicators, Estonia and Korea have substantially improved in terms of governance.
Descriptives:
6. Laeven and Valencia define banking crises when a large part of the private sector (financial and non financial companies) is in default or facing liquidity issues, and, therefore non-performing loans surge and most capital is exhausted. A country experiences currency crisis when its currency depreciates at least 30 percent in nominal terms, if it represents a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the previous year. Finally, debt crises include the year of sovereign defaults to private lending. Table 7 reports the results. Focusing on our main contribution, the role of institutional variables, we find that gross capital flows are highly associated with institutional quality. As expected, an improvement in political institutions attracts more capital inflows (CI) if foreign investors look for safer investments. Indeed, the expected net present value of investments in countries with better governance can improve thanks to a reduction of uncertainty. Foreign agents can consider countries with institutional vulnerabilities riskier. This is true for all income countries and for the two sub-samples analyzed. With regards to gross capital outflows (CO), the sign of institutional quality is also positive and significant for high-income economies, signaling that improvements in governance will facilitate the build-up of external savings. A sound institutional framework creates a market friendly environment and incentivizes the growth of domestic companies with the capacity to invest abroad, boosting domestic investment overseas and therefore gross capital outflows. This is true for high-income countries. However, for low-income economies, institutional quality is negative and insignificant. When controlling for capital account openness (Table 8) , governance turns out to be negative and significant, which indicates that in poorer economies there may be a crowding-out effect. As institutional quality improves, domestic investors may decide to invest 7. There are good reasons to believe that push factors do not face endogeneity issues. 8. Indeed, Pesaran´s CD test rejects the null hypothesis of spatial independence.
in their own country instead of abroad, restricting capital outflows. But, as the economy becomes richer, policymakers should expect higher capital outflows when there is better governance 9 .
Turning to control variables, country specific variables are key drivers of gross capital inflows (CI), as shown in Table 7 More specifically, global risk is highly correlated with periods of "stop"-a decline in gross capital inflows and "retrenchment", a decrease in gross capital outflows (Forbes, 2012 ).
Finally, a lower interest rate in the United Stated tends to boost capital flows into emerging economies but also into other advanced economies since investors will look for alternative safe assets with higher returns.
As a robustness check, we estimate a similar model controlling for financial openness and we get very similar estimates. Table 8 reports these results. Financial openness is positive and significant, which points out that capital controls mitigate both gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows. Regarding governance, the sign of coefficient estimates do not vary. Nevertheless, the coefficient of institutional quality for gross capital outflows becomes significant and negative in low and middle-income economies. In these countries, an improvement in institutional quality reduces gross capital outflows. As pointed out, domestic investors may prefer to invest in their own country instead of abroad when their institutional domestic conditions improve. Finally, we run an additional specification. We estimate the same regression as equation 1, using annual data. This regression allows us to demonstrate that our results are robust to annual data and R-squared is higher than using quarterly data, as shown in Table 9 . Capital flows are less sensitive to global factors due to the lack of inertia of these control variables and their high volatility. This is consistent with the fact that push factors can better explain short run movements whereas country specific variables matter more in the long run. Our main results are robust to this new specification. associated with a long-term relationship, portfolio and other investment flows are said to be more sensitive to domestic conditions. Therefore, a more detailed analysis is necessary, focusing on the differences between specific components. Table 10 shows the results decomposed by type of instrument. What we observe is that our main results are chiefly driven by the behavior of FDI for both gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows for all income countries, and by portfolio flows in advanced economies. It is easily understandable that institutional quality is a likely determinant of FDI inflows. First, sound governance is associated with a good business environment, which should attract more FDI. Second, corruption tends to increase investment costs and reduce the net present value of investment. With respect to capital outflows, a sound institutional framework incentivizes a market-friendly environment, boosting the creation of multinationals that will invest in their own country but also abroad. Therefore, foreign direct outflows are positively associated with the institutional quality index, as well as other investment and portfolio flows in high-income countries.
What we find most interesting is the differential effect of institutional quality on FDI depending on the level of income. While institutional quality is a key determinant to attract FDI from foreign investors in low-income countries, it is insignificant in high-income countries.
According to the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 2001 ), FDI can be explained by ownership advantages-related to acquisition of strategic assets and efficiency gains-, location advantages-explained by access to resources and to markets and cost motives-and internalization factors-due to uncertainty and incomplete contracts. A possible explanation is that location factors are a decisive determinant in less developed economies whereas specific advantages (technology, specialized human capital or know-how) are more common drivers to explain FDI patterns in more developed economies. Location advantages include resources endowment, lower labor costs and institutional degree of development in host countries. FDI investors might discriminate among developing countries according to their institutional quality, as they tend to invest more in countries with credible and sound institutions while poor governance will deter inward FDI. This behavior is consistent with the economic theory as poor institutions increase negotiation and enforcement costs. As a result, agents prefer locations where their institutional framework facilitates the development of their firm specific advantages. This is in line with the results of Buchanan et al (2012), Daude and Stein (2007) and Busse and Hefeker (2007) which provide evidence that FDI inflows are positively associated to institutional quality. Moreover, sound institutions reduce FDI volatility.
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) also show that institutions have a positive impact on foreign direct outflows for relatively developed economies. They point out that there are "diminishing returns" to institutional improvements: the poorer the economy, the higher the impact of governance on attracting FDI flows.
DEALING WITH ENDOGENEITY
Even if the use of lagged variables for pull drivers of capital flows and the introduction of country dummies mitigate endogeneity issues, it is of interest to carry an endogeneity exercise. We use a sub-sample to assess the relevance of the potential bias of OLS estimates and to determine a causal relationship between institutional drivers and capital flows. Indeed, we need to address reverse causation as higher capital inflows might encourage governments to implement reforms and to improve institutional standards. In addition, institutional estimates can be based on a qualitative assessment, influenced by the amount of inflows received. Capital flows and institutional quality may also be determined by an omitted variable. Therefore, we complement our analysis with instrumental variable models.
To do so, we need to find an appropriate instrument, relevant and exogenous. As stressed by Bazzi and Clemens (2013) faced high mortality rates, colonizers were more likely to set up extractive institutions. They also note that the local population density is an important factor to determine today´s institutions. The lower the population density, the higher the probability of developing sound institutions. The probability of capturing local population to do hard work is higher in densely populated areas. On the contrary, in areas less populated, settlers had to move there and establish sound institutions. Therefore, mortality rates of European settlers in 1500 are a valid instrument for property rights institutions. Alfaro et al (2008) used as well the log of European settler mortality rates as an instrument for institutions.
Notice that other potential instrumental variables have been excluded. We decide not to use the origin of a country´s legal system because it is found to be a weak instrument. La
Porta et al (1997) show that contractual institutions are largely influenced by the origin of a country´s legal system. English legal system countries tend to protect property rights better than countries with a French legal tradition. However, Acemoglu et al argue that is a poor instrument for institutional quality. Bazzi and Clemens criticize that "legal origins" have been used as an instrument for different endogenous variables in the growth literature and conclude that "instrumentation can be valid in at least one of these studies, and at worst none". Similarly, ethnic fragmentation from Easterly and Levine (1997) is a good proxy for political stability but not for institutional quality. Table 11 reports IV models using only the log of European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional quality. To do so, we use a sub-sample of 25 countries due to the lack of available data for the rest of countries. In panel A, we present the two-stage least squares estimates. As shown in column 1 to 6, an improvement in the institutional quality index has a causal effect on most types of capital flows. Indeed, one standard deviation in institutional quality Wald tests, robust to heteroskedasticity, reject their null hypothesis at 95% level, suggesting that the instrument used is adequate to identify the equation 13 . In addition, applying the Staiger-Stock rule of thumb, the first stage F statistic is larger than 10, implying that our 12. However, we fail to reject the null that institutional can be treated as exogenous for portfolio outflows. 13. What we do is to test the null hypothesis of weak instruments against the alternative that it is strong. Keibergen and Paap proprosed a heteroskedastic-robust statistic, which is the first stage F-statistic, that the instruments are zero.
instrument is not weak and, hence, it is relevant.
14 . Panel C reports the OLS counterpart results using the same sub-sample. The coefficient estimates turn out to be lower but not consistent since we reject the null that institutional quality may be treated as exogenous except in the estimation of other investment outflows used as a dependent variable 15 .
Comparing between IV and OLS estimates in the sub-sample used in the endogeneity exercise, we conclude that the qualitative endogeneity bias of OLS estimates is not so important since the sign of IV and OLS models do not change. Even if we assume the existence of a quantitative bias, we observe that the different sensitivity of types of flows to institutional quality does not vary substantially. Indeed, in this sub-sample the IV estimates suggest that FDI outflows are the most sensitive flows to institutional quality. The same result is obtained in the OLS model, given a lower magnitude.
As a robustness check, we estimate the same model of panel A using a limited From this endogeneity exercise, we conclude that the qualitative endogeneity bias of IV estimates is not as relevant as expected since the signs of IV and OLS models do not change significantly. Even if we assume the existence of a quantitative bias, we observe that the different sensitivity of different flows is partially maintained when comparing IV and OLS estimates of the sub-sample analyzed. In addition, the main interest of this analysis is to focus on the significance and the sign of the institutional coefficient estimates. Nevertheless, further research on IV would be interesting. estimates of in order to account for the different aspects of institutional quality. We include a country fixed specific effect, , and a time fixed effect, , as in the equation of Section 3.1.
Changes in institutional quality

MAIN RESULTS
Table 12 presents the outcome decomposed by different dimensions of institutional quality.
Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality are the institutional variables with the most explanatory power. These two dimensions of governance measure the government´s ability to implement adequate and credible policies. However, the former is oriented to the quality and independence of the public sector whereas the latter focuses on the policies that affect the private sector. Indeed, gross capital inflows (CI) are positively associated with Government
Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality for the whole sample and for the sub-sample of highincome countries. However, while Government Effectiveness seems to be a key driver in highincome countries, Regulatory Quality is more relevant in low and middle-income countries.
This implies that foreign agents invest more capital in countries with a sound policy and better quality public services, whereas the use of discretionary power might deter capital flows.
Nevertheless, in the case of low-income countries, Regulatory Quality seems to be the institutional driver of gross capital inflows, which is also a variable related to the ability of government to implement sound policies but focusing more on private sector enhancement.
This result suggests that foreign investors might discriminate in favor of countries with sound market-friendly policies when investing in poorer countries. Behaving cautiously, they will prefer to invest in countries with better bank supervision, few price controls and a perception of low burden of bureaucracy. Moreover, foreign investors will also benefit from the strength of local firms in host countries.
With regards to gross capital outflows (CO), they are positively associated with Government Effectiveness for all countries and high-income countries. A lower burden of bureaucracy and a better quality of public services not only have a positive influence on foreign investors (CI), but also on domestic agents interested in investing abroad (CO). An improvement in indicators related to the political process, civil liberties, political rights and the quality of public service provision positively affects domestic agents investing abroad. It is easily understandable that a better quality of bureaucracy and the respect of civil liberties improve the business environment, and, hence, the investment of domestic agents abroad.
Nevertheless, Government Effectiveness has the opposite effect in low and middle-income countries. Domestic investors might decide to retrench capital to invest in their country of residence when the credibility and quality of the public sector improve. In addition, political stability is negatively correlated, which illustrates that an improvement in crime rates or in domestic violence leads to a reduction of capital outflows. Moreover, the coefficient of political stability seems to be driven by low and middle-income country patterns. This can be explained by a shift in the decision-making of investors, who prefer to invest internally instead of abroad when some institutional requirements are met. However, as the economy becomes richer, this effect fades. Control variables have the expected sign and are robust to this new specification.
Finally, capital flows are not affected by Voice and Accountability. Therefore, foreign agents are more interested in specific market friendly policies and in government credibility than in civil rights or the type of government in the countries in which they invest. This accords with the strand of the literature that argues that there is no a clear causal effect between democracy and growth. 
Summing up
Institutional quality is a significant factor to explain the behavior of both foreign and domestic investors. Table 14 summarizes the main results. As hypothesized, an increase in political institutions attracts more capital flows and improves domestic conditions, in high-income countries, that will enhance the creation of multinationals, more willing to invest abroad.
Secondly, the most relevant institutional indicator seems to be Government Effectiveness, which captures the quality of public services and policy formulation and the government´s commitment to such policies, followed by Regulatory Quality. Regulatory Quality only affects gross capital inflows, but it plays a key role in low and middle-income countries, which is consistent with the fact that foreign investors might discriminate in favor of market-oriented governments in poorer economies. We will now focus on our second objective: During periods of financial stress, do markets discriminate among economies according to their institutions? respectively. We include a country fixed specific effect, , and a time fixed effect, , as in the equation of Section 3.1. Table 15 reports fixed-effect estimates. The signs of institutional quality and the significant control variables do not change significantly. As expected, the dummy crisis has a negative impact on both gross capital inflows and outflows. Moreover, the coefficient of crisis is significant for all countries and for the sub-sample of low and middle-income countries. While there is a generalized contraction in both gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows, the dynamics vary. All else equal, gross capital inflows contract on average more than gross capital outflows during periods of financial crises (Forbes (2012) and Broner et al (2013) ). That is, capital inflows by foreigners tend to decline more than capital outflows by domestic agents during periods of stress.
However, there is a differential behavior in poorer countries during periods of financial stress. Firstly, the intensity of capital flow contraction is higher than in high-income countries. Secondly, gross capital outflows tend to contract more than gross capital inflows in low and middle-income countries, as shown in Table 15 .
Focusing on the sign of , the interaction term between crisis and institutional quality, the results suggest that countries with a better institutional framework are likely to experience lower capital outflows (or a greater retrenchment) than their counterparts during periods of financial stress. This effect is especially relevant in low and middle-income countries. This pattern is explained by the behavior of domestic agents investing abroad.
Investors decide to disinvest and to repatriate funds, as Milessi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) stressed when analyzing the global financial crisis. However, our analysis differs mainly in two dimensions. First, whereas their results are based solely on the global financial crisis, we expand this analysis by including currency, debt and banking crises over 1996-2012.
Secondly, our purpose is to analyze the impact of institutional quality on the behavior of gross capital flows during periods of crises. Indeed, we find that the "great retrenchment", a decrease in gross capital outflows, tends to be more relevant in economies with sound and credible political institutions, at least in low and middle-income economies and in the whole sample. This is easily understandable. As investors are very sensitive to uncertainty, they will opt to increase their portfolio home bias, leading to a retrenchment towards domestic assets.
This trend will be more important if their residence is located in states with a better regulatory quality environment and a sound system of protection of property rights and contract enforcement. By contrast, we do not appreciate a differential effect for gross capital inflows.
There is no evidence that a better institutional quality mitigates "sudden stops", a sharp decrease in gross capital inflows. Finally, our results are mainly driven by portfolio and other investment outflow patterns. This accords with evidence that shows that other investment flows are the most volatile type of flow, followed by other portfolio. All these results are robust to the inclusion of capital account openness 16 .
To dig deeper into the role played by political institutions during periods of shocks, we expand estimation 3, distinguishing between global and domestic crises, the former referring to the Russian and Asian crises (1998-1999) and the GFC (2008-2009). capital flows is relevant during the GFC. During this specific period of time, the interaction term is also significant for high-income countries, more heavily hit by the financial crisis. However, as its coefficient is much lower than in poorer countries, we can conclude that institutional quality seems to play a more important role for domestic investors in low-income countries during periods of financial crises.
From this analysis, we can draw two conclusions. First, there is a generalized reversal of capital flows during periods of crises, regardless of whether it is a domestic or a global crisis. Indeed, crises seem to affect the relation of gross capital flows and their determinants in the short term since investors seem to behave in a more cautious way, disinvesting their positions abroad. Secondly, political institutions also matter during periods of stress. Specifically, domestic investors in countries with a sound institutional framework tend to retrench more capital, mitigating the negative effects of declining gross capital inflows.
Therefore, the real impact on the economy is reduced. This partly accords with Fratzscher's results (2012). He showed that states with "strong macro fundamentals and with good institutions experienced smaller outflows (or more capital inflows) during the crisis than countries with weak fundamentals and high country risk". However, our results do not only focus on GFC but on different types of crises. In addition, institutional quality seems to be more relevant in low and middle-income economies during periods of stress. Finally, there is no evidence that better institutional quality might also mitigate "sudden stops", a sharp decrease in gross capital inflows.
16. These results are provided under request.
These results are relevant for policy-makers. The retrenchment in gross capital outflows can help cushion financial shocks by reducing the need for a large current account adjustment. Indeed, gross capital reversals from domestic investors partially compensates the effects of "sudden stops", the reduction in gross capital inflows, leading to a lower reduction in net capital flows, and, therefore, reducing its negative impact on the real economy and on the financial requirements of countries.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the institutional drivers of capital flows in a panel data of 56 countries over a period of almost twenty years. Our main objective is to answer: How relevant are institutions to explain the pattern of flows? And, in periods of financial stress, do markets discriminate among economies according to their institutions?
Our main contribution is that institutional quality matters in the long-term pattern of flows and helps us to better understand domestic agents´ behavior during periods of financial stress. Indeed, the fixed-effect estimates imply that institutional quality has a positive impact on both gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows. As hypothesized, an improvement in political institutions attracts more capital flows and boosts domestic conditions in highincome countries, which in turn enhance the creation of multinationals, more willing to invest abroad. However, for low and middle-income economies, institutional quality is negative and insignificant for gross capital outflows. When controlling for capital account openness, governance turns out to be significant and negative, which indicates that in poorer economies domestic investors may decide to invest in their own country instead of abroad, restricting capital outflows. But, as the economy becomes richer, policymakers should expect higher capital outflows if governance improves. In addition, using a sub-sample of 25 countries, the IV estimates infer the existence of a causal effect of institutional quality on gross capital flows.
Moreover, the most relevant institutional indicators seem to be Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality, which capture the government´s ability to implement sound and credible policies. While the former is oriented to the quality of public services and policy formulation and the government´s commitment to such policies, the latter refers to private sector enhancement policies. Government Effectiveness has a positive impact on both gross capital inflows and outflows. Therefore, a lower burden of bureaucracy and better quality public services not only have a positive influence on foreign investors, but also on domestic agents interested in investing abroad. On the contrary, the use of discretionary power might deter capital flows. Regulatory Quality also plays a key role in explaining gross capital inflows, especially in low and middle-income countries. By contrast, democratic aspects do not seem to play a significant role in explaining foreign agents´ investment decisions. This result suggests that foreign agents are more interested in specific market friendly policies and in government credibility than in civil rights or the type of regime of the countries in which they invest. This is in line with the strand of literature that argues that there is no clear effect between democracy and growth.
Our results are mainly driven by the behavior of FDI and portfolio flows. What is more interesting is the differential impact of institutional quality on FDI depending on the level of income. While governance is a key driver of FDI in low and middle-income countries, it has no impact on high-income countries. The underlying explanation lies in the determinants of FDI.
In less developed economies, location factors-access to natural resources, lower labor costs-play an important role. Among these location factors, recent research (Dunning, 2006) highlights the relevance of institutional development. Indeed, we find that inward FDI in low and middle-economies is associated with better Government Effectiveness, Regulatory
Quality and Control of Corruption. By contrast, FDI in more developed economies is mainly affected by specific advantages, such as technology advantages and specialized human capital.
Turning to the role of institutional variables during periods of crises, we find that political institutions also matter when explaining the behavior of domestic agents investing abroad. More specifically, countries with a better institutional framework are likely to experience lower capital outflows (or a greater retrenchment) than their counterparts during periods of financial stress, regardless of whether it is a domestic or a global crisis. This pattern is explained by the behavior of domestic investors. As investors are very sensitive to uncertainty, they will opt to increase their portfolio home bias, leading to a "retrenchment" of capital invested abroad towards domestic assets. This trend is more important if their residence is located in states with sound and credible political institutions and a better system of protection of property rights. By contrast, there is no clear evidence that institutional quality plays a differential role during periods of crises to explain gross capital inflow patterns.
Therefore, institutional factors incentivize the build-up of external assets in high-income countries, by promoting larger capital outflows, in normal times. But, they also facilitate the repatriation of such assets in periods of crises. The retrenchment of gross capital outflows can counteract the negative effect of declining gross capital inflows, cushioning financial shocks by reducing the need for a large current account adjustment. Therefore, the impact on the real economy and on the financial requirements of countries will be lower.
To attract more gross capital flows or to cushion financial shocks, policymakers can improve institutional quality and, in particular, Government Effectiveness and Regulatory
Quality. In order to increase the quality of public service and bureaucracy, governments In addition, * denotes the countries used in the IV subsample.
List of countries. Classification by Region and Income (WTI)
High income countries (34) (GNI pc> $11,906) Low and middle income countries (22) ($976<GNI pc< $11,905)
OECD (27) 3. Government Effectiveness (GE)-"capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government´s commitment to such policies."
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ)-"capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development."
5. Rule of Law (RL) -"capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence".
6. Control of Corruption (CC) -"capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests". This table presents the results of the principal component regression. The dependent variables are reported for our baseline sample. However, we include the six components, stemmed from a principal component analysis of the six governance indicators, controlling for push factors (GDP growth, spread long term interes, public debt, gross external debt, reserves GDP, credit GDP and squared credit GDP) and push factors (vix variation, world GDP growth and US 10 year Treasury bill rates). The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period.Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. and other investment (Oinv). These variables are normalized by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and by dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country and year dummies and the control variables included in Table 7 (GDP growth, spread long term interest, public debt, gross external debt, reserves GDP, credit GDP, credit GDP^2, vix variation, world GDP growth and US 10 year Treasury bill rates). The results are absolute values of heretoreskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation adjusted standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME ALL COUNTRIES HIGH INCOME This table summarizes the results of table 7 , 10 and 13. We present our estimates using the institutional quality index, and then decomposed by institutional factors. The dependent variables are Capital Inflows by foreign agents (CI) decomposed by instruments: foreign direct inflows (Ifdi), portfolio inflows (Iportfolio) and other investment (Ioinv) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), decomposed by instruments: foreign investment (Ofdi), portfolio (Oportfolio) and other investment (Oinv). These variables are normalized by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and by dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country and year and quarterly dummies and the control variables included in Table 7 and 13. (GDP growth, spread long term interest, public debt, gross external debt, reserves GDP, credit GDP, credit GDP^2, vix variation, world GDP growth and US 10 year Treasury bill rates). The results are absolute values of heretoreskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation adjusted standard errors.
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively ALL COUNTRIES The dependent variables are capital inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country, year andquarterly dummies. In addition, a crisis dummy is included and we interact it with institutional quality. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately by income.
The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
All countries High income Low and middle income The dependent variables are capital inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country, year and quarter dummies. In addition, a crisis dummy is included and we interact it, distinguishing between global and domestic crisis, with institutional quality. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately by income. The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are given in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
All countries High income Low and middle income The dependent variables are capital inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country quarter and year dummies. In addition, a crisis dummy for the global financial crisis (GFC) is included and we interact it with institutional quality. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately by income. The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period.
Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
All countries High income Low and middle income
